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THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES. AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO 1995-2006. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper aims to analyze the results from an empirical study about judicial review in 
Mexico from 1995 to 2006, during the democratization process, in the light of the 
concept of deliberative democracy. Thus, it is divided into three parts. Part One gives 
some background about the historical, political and legal context in the Mexican case. 
Part Two shows the findings of the quantitative analysis about the Constitutional 
Controversies and Actions of Unconstitutionality settled by the Mexican Supreme Court 
of Justice for the last period of the authoritarian regime (1995-2000) and the first 
government of an opposition party (2000-2006). The last part is devoted to the 
discussion of the findings, as well as the discussion about the role of constitutional 
courts in new democracies from a deliberative point of view; how constitutional courts 
can contribute to settle democracy through their –deliberative- judgments. 
 
Key words 
 
Judicial review; Constitutional Courts; New Democracies; Deliberative Democracy; 
Mexican Supreme Court of Justice; Actions of Unconstitutionality; Constitutional 
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THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES. AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO 1995-2006. 
 
The empirical study about the judicial review in Mexico consists in the analysis of the 
actions of unconstitutionality and the constitutional controversies1 settled by the 
Mexican Supreme Court of Justice (hereafter SCJN, for its acronym in Spanish, or the 
Court) in order to know: Who goes before the Court? Who are the main petitioners? 
What kind of cases do they bring before the Court? What has been the answer of the 
Court to them? And in which cases the Court has declared that a law and/or an act are 
unconstitutional? 
  
The model developed by Siri Gloppen2 was a stimulus to design our own model. We 
use the following variables for the analysis of judicial review in Mexico: voice, it refers 
to who goes before the Court in actions of unconstitutionality and in constitutional 
controversies. In other words, who is the voice of constitutional judicial review in 
Mexico? Responsiveness, it refers to the willingness of the SCJN to listen to the voices 
that go before the Court. In other words, what kind of cases did the Court accept, reject 
or provide a resolution for, without examining the merits of the case. Attitude, it refers 
to the position that the Court takes regarding other branches. In order words, in which 
cases the Court decides if a law or an act is constitutional or unconstitutional. 
 
Using these variables we measured the behavior of SCJN during the period 1995-2006 –
which consists of two important stages of the most recent political history of Mexico: 
the last period of the authoritarian regime (1995-2000) and the first government of an 
                                                            
1 The Mexican Constitution states checks & balances system. This system consists of seven legal 
mechanisms, five of which are resolved in the judicial field. These legal mechanisms are: Amparo, 
constitutional controversies, actions of unconstitutionality, jurisdictional proceedings to protect the 
electoral rights of citizens to vote and to be voted, as well as the constitutional review in electoral issues, 
impeachment proceedings, the proceedings to protect human rights before the Ombudsman, and the 
exclusive faculty of the Mexican Court to investigate a fact or facts constituting a serious violation to any 
constitutional right. However this study is delimited to constitutional controversies and actions of 
unconstitutionality. 
2 According to Siri Gloppen, voice concerns to the ability of marginalized groups to voice effectively their 
claims or have them voiced on their behalf. Court responsiveness refers to the willingness of the Courts to 
respond to the concerns of marginalized groups. Capability refers to judges’ ability to give legal effect to 
social (and other) rights in ways that significantly affect the situation of marginalized groups, while 
compliance concerns to the extent to which these judgments are politically authoritative, and whether the 
political branches comply with them and implement and reflect them in legislation policies. Gloppen Siri, 
“Courts and Social Transformation: An Analytical Framework” in Roberto Gargarella, Pilar Domingo 
and Theunis Roux, Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies. An Institutional Voice for the 
Poor?, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2006, pp. 36-37. 
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opposition party (2000-2006). We applied these variables to 1,371 cases, 254 of them 
actions of unconstitutionality and 1,117 of them constitutional controversies. It is 
important to mention that during the period 1995 to 2006, the SCJN resolved 316 cases 
regarding actions of unconstitutionality and 1,119 cases of constitutional controversies. 
The difference between resolved cases and analyzed cases is due to the number of cases 
in which we had access to the full text of the judgments. The judgments are available 
(only in Spanish) at the web page of the Court www.scjn.gob.mx through the link 
“Consulta de Expedientes”.  
  
For the discussion we found that the concept of deliberative democracy suits best for 
this paper. According to Michel Walzer,3 deliberative democracy is a rational process of 
weighing the available data, considering alternative possibilities, arguing about 
relevance and worthiness, and then choosing about the best policy or person. Moreover, 
in terms of Carlos S. Nino,4 the consensus reached after an exercise of collective 
discussion must have some reliability as to the knowledge of moral truths. Put plainly, 
deliberative democracy could be defined as a system in which the opinion of the 
majority is restricted to the opinion of those who have been involved in a policy.  
 
I. Historical and political context and legal framework 
 
The ambition that led the Mexican Revolution in 1921 was to establish a democratic 
state. What happened after 1921 was quite the opposite. Mexico fell under the 
authoritarian regime of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Revolutionary 
Institutional Party, hereafter PRI), which held power from 1921 until 2000. The success 
of the authoritarian regime was the foundation of some institutions that gave legitimacy 
to authoritarian acts coming from the State. During the PRI regime, the opposition 
parties, the unions and the economic and social policies were controlled by the PRI. 
Abroad however, Mexico had the appearance of prosperity, democracy and modernity.5 
                                                            
3 See Bächtinger André and Steiner Jürg, Introduction, Acta politica, International Journal of Political 
Science, Volume 40 Number 2, July 2005, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 153. 
4 Nino, Carlos S., The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1996, 
p. 143. 
5 The Presidents Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), changed 
the economic policy, giving Mexico the appearance of modernity at international level. They started to 
subscribe international economic agreements and to open the economy to international markets. This 
meant the establishment of the neoliberal policy. In words of Fudge & Owens, the Neoliberalism favors 
limitations on the exercise of political power for egalitarian purposes and calls for deregulation, 
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The authoritarian regime was based on two central institutions: the official party (PRI) 
and the President. The PRI had control over the electoral system. There were periodic 
elections, although there was not a real contender, thus guaranteeing the PRI constant 
victory. The President had control over the whole political system.6 The Mexican 
President’s extraordinary range of powers included the capacity to reform the 
Constitution by proposing amendments unchallenged by the Congress; he designated 
his own successor; he nominated most of the congressional candidates of his party; he 
removed mayors, governors, and members of the Congress from their posts; he 
designated members of his cabinet and removed them at will; and he filled the judicial 
branch with his appointees.7 Moreover, the executive had a strong role in the judiciary; 
it was very well known that during the PRI regime, the judicial branch – as well as the 
legislative branch – was subdued. Thus, the judicial branch was not recognized as a 
legal arbiter.8  
 
The establishment of judicial review in Mexico took place in 1995; as a result, the 
Mexican Supreme Court of Justice became a Constitutional Court.9 It is important to 
highlight that this fact took place in the middle of relevant social, political and 
economical events. On January 1st, 1994, Mexico signed the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) alongside USA and Canada. Meanwhile, in the southern 
province of Chiapas, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) started a 
rebellion demanding the rights of indigenous people and against the dictatorship.10 In 
March 1994, Luis Donaldo Colosio (PRI Presidential candidate) and Franciso Ruiz 
Masseiu (PRI General Secretary) were assassinated. And last but not least, the 1994 
                                                                                                                                                                              
privatization, supply-side rather than demand-side macro-economic measures, and a withering away of 
the welfare state. It is closely associated with national economic agreements, such as free trade 
agreements (FTAs), which ‘serve as a restructuring tool or, put differently, as a conditioning institutional 
framework that promotes and consolidates neoliberal restructuring”. See Judy Fudge and Rosemary 
Owens, Precarious Work, Women and the New Economy: The Challenge of Legal Norms, Oxford, Hart, 
2006, p. 5. 
6 See Philip George, Democracy in Latin America. Surviving Conflict and Crisis? Polity, UK, 2003, p. 
176. 
7 Weldon Jeffry, “The political sources of Presidentialism in Mexico”, in Presidentialism and Democracy 
in Latin America, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Schugart, New York, Cambridge University Press, 
1996. 
8 Marván Laborde, 1997, quoted by Phillip George, op. cit., p. 180. 
9 It is important to mention that the Court keeps its original name as Mexican Supreme Court of Justice as 
well as its jurisdiction as Court of Cassation. It means that the Mexican Supreme Court became a 
Constitutional Court de facto. There is not a Constitutional Court but the Mexican Supreme Court of 
Justice is at the same time a Constitutional Court and a Court of Cassation. 
10 For further information see Primera Declaratoria de la Selva Lacandona. August 2010. < 
http://www.nodo50.org/pchiapas/chiapas/documentos/selva.htm> 
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economic crisis, widely known as the Mexican peso crisis or ‘Tequila Effect’, was 
triggered by an overnight devaluation of the Mexican peso in the early days of Ernesto 
Zedillo’s Presidency in December 1994.  
 
Finally, in July 2000, the opposition party Partido Acción Nacional11 (hereafter PAN) 
won the elections for the first time in the history of Mexico and is still in power. Since 
2000, Mexico is considered to be in the second part of the democratization process.  
 
Mexico's contemporary legal system emerged as a result of the 1910 Revolution and the 
subsequent promulgation of its Federal Constitution on February 5, 1917. Although 
historically influenced by the legal systems of Spain, France, and the United States, 
Mexico has been able to structure and maintain a distinctive legal system that 
incorporates truly unique Mexican components.  
 
Mexico has adopted a mixed system of judicial review. This means that it is a hybrid 
between the American and European systems. Table 1 below shows the main 
characteristics of the judicial review system in Mexico. 
Table 1 
 
Table 1 
The model of judicial review in Mexico12 
Institutional structure 
Who has the power to engage in judicial 
review? 
Centralized system. Only the Mexican Supreme 
Court as Constitutional Court; can exercise judicial 
review; other Courts are typically barred from doing 
so. 
Timing 
When can judicial review occur? 
A posteriori or ex post. Mexican Supreme Court can 
only exercise a judicial review after an act has 
occurred or taken effect under the established legal 
time limiting. 
Type 
Can judicial review take place in the 
absence of a real case or controversy? 
Abstract and Concrete Review. The Mexican 
Supreme Court can exercise a concrete review as well 
as a review in the absence of a real case or 
controversy. 
Standing 
Who can initiate disputes? 
The range is broad among governmental actors 
(including Executive holders and members of the 
Legislature) 
 
                                                            
11 The PAN is one of the three main political parties in Mexico. It was founded in 1939. They consider 
themselves as a center-right, Christian democratic political party. 
12 We took Table 1. Key Characteristics of Court Systems as a model, from Epstein, Knight & Shvestova, 
The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of 
Government, Law & Society Review, Volume 35, Number 1, 2001, p. 121. 
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The constitutional reform of December 31, 199413 had the intention to strengthen the 
SCJN as Constitutional Court and introduce judicial review. From this reform on, 
Mexico has had a centralized judicial review system. This means that only the SCJN 
can exercise a judicial review; other Courts are typically barred from doing so. The 
main instruments for judicial review are constitutional controversies and actions of 
unconstitutionality. Table 2 describes the main characteristics of these two legal 
instruments. 
 
Table 2 
Actions of Unconstitutionality and Constitutional Controversies.  Characteristics 
 Actions of Unconstitutionality Constitutional Controversies 
Definition 
They are trials before the SCJN, by which 
one can submit a contradiction between a 
general legal provision (law, decree, 
regulation or international treaty) on the 
one hand, and the Constitution on the 
other hand, with the objective to 
invalidate the law or the treaty if it is 
unconstitutional. It is an abstract revision 
of the Constitution without a concrete 
case. 
They are trials before the SCJN, in the case 
of disputes arising between branches 
(Executive, Legislative or Judicial) or levels 
of government (Federal, Local, Municipal 
and Federal District) as well as in the case 
that an authority encroaches on the 
sovereignty or on the jurisdiction of another 
authority. It is necessary the existence of a 
concrete case. 
Parties 
Petitioner 
A minority in parliament, the General 
Attorney or a political party. 
The Federation, the States, the 
Municipalities, the Federal District and/or 
their branches –Executive, Legislative or 
Judicial- through a public servant. 
Respondent 
The legislative or executive authority that 
enacted the general legal provision or 
treaty. 
The authority that executed or enacted the 
act and/or the law. 
General 
Attorney 
The General Attorney always acts as a social representative, except when acting as the 
plaintiff in actions of unconstitutionality. 
Effects of 
the 
judgments 
The resolution issued by the SCJN 
declaring null and void a general legal 
provision, shall have general binding 
effects, when approved by the vote of a 
majority of at least eight Justices. 
Only in some cases the resolution issued by 
the SCJN declaring null and void a general 
legal provision, shall have general binding 
effects, when approved by the vote of a 
majority or at least eight Justices. General 
binding effects occur in disputes between: 
Federation vs. States or Municipalities, 
States vs. Municipalities, Federal Executive 
Branch vs. Congress, Branches of the same 
State/Federal District regarding the laws 
executed or enacted by them. 
 
SOURCE: Own elaboration according to Mexican Constitution and Act Regulating Sections I and II of Article 105 of the Mexican 
Constitution. Year 2009. 
                                                            
13 Ernesto Zedillo (the last PRI President 1994-2000) sent a law bill related to judicial review to the 
Congress as the first act of his government. The Congress approved it immediately. Thus, the 
constitutional reform of December 31th 1994 came into force the day after its publication in the Official 
Journal of the Federation (Mexico).  
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II. The status of judicial review in Mexico: a comparative analysis of the 
variables voice, responsiveness and attitude during the period of transition: 
1995 to 2006. 
 
The objective of this section is to compare and to contrast the findings among the 
variables voice, responsiveness and attitude applied to the collected data regarding to 
the last period of PRI’s regime (1995-2000) with the first government of the PAN 
(2001-2006). Tables 3 and 4 summarize the findings of the comparative analysis of the 
variables in both periods. Table 3 shows the findings in actions of unconstitutionality, 
while Table 4 shows them in constitutional controversies. 
 
Table 3 
Actions of Unconstitutionality 
Comparative analysis of the variables voice, responsiveness and attitude 
Variables PRI Period PAN Period 
Voice 
- Political parties 
- Absence of the General 
Attorney. 
- Low representation of PRI. 
- Political parties 
- The General Attorney became the 
second political actor to go before 
the Court. 
Unconstitutional resolutions among the 
political parties and Local Congresses 
are proportional. 
- Considerable amount of resolutions in 
favor of the General Attorney in which the 
Court has issued the general legal 
provision unconstitutional. 
 
- It is possible to identify a new dynamic 
inside the Plenary in the Court since it has 
had new appointments. It means the 
increase of cases in which the Court 
analyzes the merits of the case. 
Responsiveness 
 
It seems a fair period for the political parties regarding the resolutions of the Court. 
Attitude Both periods are characterized by judicial policy of declaring unconstitutional laws from the local level rather than the laws from the Federal level.  
 
SOURCE: Own elaboration with data from the Mexican Court judgments. Year 2009. 
 
During the period 1995 to 2006, 42% of the actions of unconstitutionality were brought 
before the Court by the main opposition parties, PAN and Partido de la Revolución 
Democrática (hereafter PRD). PAN and PRD represent the second and third political 
force in Mexico. They are the only two parties that have achieved reaching power in 
some states and in some Municipalities. 
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We also found that the local legislative minorities are the third petitioner in actions of 
unconstitutionality during the period 1995 to 2006. However four states (Yucatán, 
Aguascalientes, Chihuahua and Nuevo León) concentrate 34% of the cases brought 
before the Court, while the other 66% of the cases is divided by 28 states (with 
percentages between 2% and 5%). It is important to say that these states were governed 
by PRI until 1997 when PAN started to govern. However, PRI regained the power in the 
mean time. These are samples of the political and institutional battle for power among 
the parties at the judicial field. 
  
Table 4 
Constitutional Controversies 
Comparative analysis of the variables voice, responsiveness and attitude 
Variables PRI Period PAN Period 
Voice 
The Municipalities and the States are 
the main petitioners. Oaxaca is the State 
with the largest number of 
Municipalities that go before the Court. 
 
- The Federation started to appear before 
the Court as well as Federal District. 
Moreover, some other actors without 
legitimacy started to appear before the 
Court, seeking for a ‘fair arbitrator’. 
 
- Increase of the number of disputes 
brought before the Court. 
 
- In 2001 the Municipalities of the whole 
country brought before the Court 330 
constitutional controversies against the 
constitutional reform in indigenous 
issues.14 
Responsiveness 
 
In both periods it is possible to observe that the Court did not analyze the merits of the 
case when the Municipality was the petitioner. It is important to highlight that, during 
the PRI period the Court ceased the proceedings of the case while, during the PAN 
period the Court declared the case inadmissible. 
Attitude 
- In the case of these 330 constitutional controversies against the indigenous reform, 
the Court held the inadmissibility by virtue that the SCJN does not have jurisdiction 
for revising the acts of the Constituent Assembly. 
-In both periods the Court analyzed the merits of the case when the Federation is the 
petitioner. However, when a law and/or an act from the Federal level are at stake, the 
Court held the inadmissibility of these cases, as in the case of indigenous reform 
controversies.  
- Both periods are characterized by judicial policy of declaring laws unconstitutional 
from the Local level rather than laws from the Federal level. 
 
SOURCE: Own elaboration with data from the Mexican Court judgments. Year 2009. 
 
                                                            
14 Since 1992 the Mexican Constitution recognizes that the Mexican nation has a pluralistic composition 
based originally on its indigenous communities. However, these rights were never enforced at the 
juridical level. It means that the Regulating Act never was enacted. This attitude from the government 
through the indigenous communities rights triggered the emergence of Ejército Zapatista de Liberación 
Nacional (EZLN) in Chiapas on December 1st; 1994. 
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As we can observe that in both periods there are some similarities among the variables 
in constitutional controversies as well as in actions of unconstitutionality. However, we 
found some facts that draw attention. In the case of actions of unconstitutionality, the 
Court analyzed the merits of the case in 67% of the cases and declared local laws as 
well as electoral local laws unconstitutional. While in the case of constitutional 
controversies, the Court avoided analyzing the merits of the case in 65% of the cases 
and declared laws and/or acts from the local level as unconstitutional. Tables 5 and 6 
show these findings. 
 
Table 5 
Responsiveness of the Court. Actions of Unconstitutionality 
Petitioner Cases 
Analyzing 
the merits of 
the case 
% 
Not 
analyzing the 
merits of the 
case 
% 
Political Parties 106 74 70 32 30 
General Attorney 64 45 70 19 30 
Local legislative 
minorities 62 40 65 22 35 
Federal District 11 9 82 2 18 
Deputies 8 1 13 7 88 
Senators 2 1 50 1 50 
Others 1 1 100  0 
TOTAL 254 171 67% 83 33% 
SOURCE: Own elaboration with data from the Mexican Court judgments. Year 2009. 
 
Table 6 
Responsiveness of the Court. Constitutional Controversies 
Petitioner Cases 
Analyzing 
the merits of 
the case 
% 
Not analyzing 
the merits of 
the case 
%
Voluntary 
dismissal by 
petitioner 
% No data % 
States 138 61 44 72 52 3 2 2 1 
Federation 27 21 78 6 22  0  0 
Municipalities 896 268 30 604 67 20 2 4 0 
Federal 
District 30 8 27 22 73  0  0 
Without data 3  0 3 100  0 1 33 
Others 23  0 23 100  0  0 
TOTAL 1117 358 32% 730 65% 23 2% 7 1% 
SOURCE: Own elaboration with data from the Mexican Court judgments. Year 2009. 
 
Moreover it is important to highlight the fact that citizens are not able to go before the 
Court through actions of unconstitutionality. There is no possibility for citizens to 
appear themselves before the Court if they consider that a law from the executive or 
legislative branches could be unconstitutional. 
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Finally, we found that during the first 11 years of the SCJN as a Constitutional Court, 
1.6%15 of the cases were declared unconstitutional. 
  
III. Discussion: The findings in the Mexican case and the debate about the role 
of Constitutional Courts in new democracies from a deliberative point of 
view. 
 
About the findings in the Mexican case, it is possible to assert that the behavior of the 
Court could be interpreted as some kind of deference regarding the Executive Branch as 
well as some kind of caution to declare as unconstitutional a federal law that come from 
the Congress. 
 
One of the reasons that could explain this behavior of the Court is the institutional 
inertia imposed by the authoritarian regime. It is important to take into account that in 
1997, the PRI, for the second time, lost the majority in the House of Deputies. Thus, 
since 1997 a new dynamic in the Congress exists. Bills are presented from a wide range 
of political affiliations.16 This pluralism inside the Congress has led to the appearance of 
other political actors before the Court. As a result of this dynamic, the Court is deciding 
issues that were formerly decided in the Executive or Legislative fields. Thus, the 
Mexican Supreme Court has become another political actor. Through its judgments the 
Court has consequently turned it into a policy-maker. 
 
Although, there is an institutional arbiter for the disputes, it is possible to perceive some 
remains from the authoritarian regime in which the inertia to obey, and not to question 
the decisions of the President were usual. We observe this in the fact that the Court 
during its first 11 years as Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional 1.6% of the 
(analyzed) cases as well as in the fact that the Court avoided the analysis of the merits 
of the case when federal laws and/or acts are involved. 
 
                                                            
15 This percentage is the result of the next arithmetical addition: 6 cases out of 254 actions of 
unconstitutionality plus 16 out of 1,117 constitutional controversies; makes 22 cases divided into 1,371 
(which is the total of revised cases). 
16 This information is available at the web page of the Mexican Congress. August 2010. 
<http://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/Iniciativas/57/gp57_a1primero.html> 
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Other reason could be legal technicalities. According to Epstein et al.,17 the role of 
constitutional courts in their systems could be characterized as constrained or 
unconstrained actors. If we contrast this opinion with the findings of this study it is 
possible to assert that the Mexican Supreme Court has been acting as a constrained 
constitutional court. 
 
This qualification could be found in the legal framework of the judicial review system. 
We found some technicalities that make it difficult to declare a general legal provision 
as unconstitutional: a) regarding the actions of unconstitutionality: Article 105, of the 
Mexican Constitution states that the Court can only declare unconstitutionality if the 
resolution is approved by a majority of at least eight Justices, b) regarding the 
constitutional controversies: Article 105, section I of the Mexican Constitution only 
restricts the declaration of unconstitutionality to disputes between the Federation vs. 
States or Municipalities, States vs. Municipalities, Federal Executive Branch vs. 
Congress or two Branches of the same State/Federal District regarding the laws 
executed or enacted by them. This kind of resolution has to be approved by a majority 
of at least eight Justices. 
 
According to Beatriz Magaloni,18 the constitutional reform of 1994 – designed by the 
PRI – established this restricted legal framework in order to protect future PRI interests 
in case it lost power after the reform. Thus, they designed this model of Constitutional 
Court in order to maintain control over governmental policies. 
 
Other reason could be that the Court has been focused in the establishment and 
maintenance of its autonomy and its independence. At the same time, the Court has 
been concerned about keeping its institutional stability. Clearly, this has meant staying 
on the sidelines regarding the enforcement of human and social-economic rights of the 
petitioners or, in terms of this work, to not have the disposition to listen to the voices.  
 
In the words of Epstein, et al.,19 in the initial stages of the transition to a constitutional 
                                                            
17 Epstein Lee, et al., op. cit., p. 123;  
18 Magaloni Beatriz, “Enforcing the Autocratic Political Order and the Role of Courts: The Case of 
Mexico” in Ginsburg Tom y Tamir Moustafa (editors), Rule by Law: The politics of Courts in 
Authoritarian Regimes, Cambridge, USA, 2008, pp. 199-200. 
19 Epstein et. al., op. cit., pp. 155-156. 
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democracy if the legitimacy of the constitutional court is low, as it will commonly be 
the case, the Court is caught in an uncomfortable dilemma. At a time when the 
emerging democracy is most in need of a way to resolve basic constitutional questions – 
such as issues about the distribution of authority among the branches of government – 
the constitutional court is least able to do so effectively. 
 
Let the findings in the Mexican case serve as example to set the discussion about the 
proper role of constitutional courts in new democracies. How constitutional courts could 
help to settle deliberative democracy? Democracy consolidation depends on many 
variables where each of them has a greater impact compared with the judicial review; 
however, it is necessary not to overestimate the constitutional court responsibility as 
Dieter Nohlen20 has pointed out. 
 
We consider that if constitutional courts assume a deliberative attitude through its 
judgments they could start to change the policy-making dynamics. The concept of 
deliberative democracy is wide enough to be expanded towards the tasks of 
constitutional courts. This implies a deliberative understanding of democracy and 
consequently a shift of its judgments into more deliberative documents.  
 
Roberto Gargarella21 points out that, even if prima facie the dialogic model could be 
seen as something far away from the law field, it is true that some of the most renowned 
contemporary Courts have been adopting the deliberative approach in their judgments, 
explicitly or implicitly. Such is the case of constitutional courts in India, South Africa, 
Hungary and Colombia. Scott and Macklem,22 hold that the Constitutional Court in 
India is stressing the cooperative dialogue between the Judicial branch, on the one hand, 
and the Executive and Legislative branches on the other hand. This is an example of a 
broad interpretation of the traditional Separation of Powers principle. How the 
Constitutional Court in India has been stressing the dialogue? Through setting directives 
for the Executive branch as well as through suggesting flexible guidelines that are 
promoting dialogue between the Court and political actors. 
                                                            
20 Nohlen Dieter, “Jurisdicción Constitucional y Consolidación de la Democracia”, in Suprema Corte de 
Justicia de la Nación, Tribunales Constitucionales y Democracia, México, 2008, p. 30. 
21 See Gargarella Roberto, “Un papel renovado para la Corte Suprema. Democracia e interpretación 
judicial de la Constitución” in Tribunales Constitucionales y Democracia, Suprema Corte de Justicia de 
la Nación, México, p. 424. 
22 Ibid. 
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The case of the Colombian Court is also interesting. According to Scott and Macklem, 
the Colombian Constitutional Court has been promoting the creation of new 
mechanisms for dialogue; such as a round table with the possibility for the convergence 
of different actors like the government, businessmen, as well as group of citizens whose 
interests have been affected. Furthermore, in politically relevant cases the Court has 
settled some guidelines resolutions in order to favor the dialogue among political actors. 
In the words of Uprimny Yepes,23  the Colombian Court has gained respect and prestige 
from social groups that are very critical about the government. This has been possible 
because access to justice is simple and inexpensive. Thus, some social groups have 
opted to go before the Court rather than turn to mass mobilization, avoiding the risks 
that it implies. 
 
However, it is important to take into account the other side of the coin. After reviewing 
some literature about the constitutional courts it is possible to identify how the heart of 
the theoretical problem of the judicial review, known as counter-majoritarian difficulty, 
has been the focus of many theoretical and empirical investigations. The concern with 
respect to the phenomenon of judges making public policies that previously had been or 
that, in the opinion of most, ought to be made by legislative and executive officials 
appears to be on the increase.24 
  
Thus the judicialization of politics is considered, for better or for worse, as one of the 
most significant trends in the late twentieth and early twenty-first- century government. 
Moreover, it is possible to observe this tendency among international and supranational 
courts to act as constitutional courts.25 
  
According to Hirschl,26 over the last few decades the world has witnessed a profound 
transfer of power from representative institutions to judiciaries, whether domestic or 
                                                            
23 See Uprimny Yepes Rodrigo, The Judicial Protection of Social Rights by the Colombian Constitutional 
Court: Cases and Debates, August 2010, 
 http://dejusticia.org/interna.php?id_tipo_publicacion=2&id_publicacion=361 
24 Tate C. Neal and Vallinder Torbjörn (editors), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power, New York 
University Press, New York, 1995, p. 2. 
25 Tate C. Neal and Vallinder Torbjörn, op. cit., p. 5; Adams, Maurice and van der Schyff, Gerhard, 
"Political Theory Put to the Test: Comparative Law and the Origins of Judicial Constitutional 
Review," Global Juris, Vol. 10: ISS. 2 (Topics), Article 8, 2010, p. 2 and Hirschl Ran, “The 
judicialization of politics” in The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, Edited by Keith E. Whittington, 
R. Daniel Kelemen and Gregory A. Caldeira, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 119-138. 
26 Hirschl Ran, “The judicialization of politics” op. cit., p. 138. 
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supranational. He asserts that the judicialization of politics has extended well beyond 
the now “standard” judicialization of policy-making to encompass questions of pure 
politics –electoral processes and its outcomes, restorative justice, regime legitimacy, 
executive prerogatives, collective identity, and nation-building. These developments 
reflect the demise of the “political question” doctrine, and mark a transition to what he 
has termed “juristocracy”. 
 
Adams & Van der Schyff 27 explain that when essential societal issues cannot be 
resolved or addressed via the regular political channels, because of a structural political 
deadlock in parliament (or executive), other bodies (e.g. courts) will be empowered to 
cut the knots. However, to extend the competences (powers) of these bodies 
(constitutional courts) is then the direct result of a weak or chronically ineffectual 
political system.  
  
In the same way Marian Ahumada28 considers that constitutional democracy by the 
Judiciary has been seen as a pragmatic solution in order to provide legitimacy into a 
non-perfect democratic government, which at the end is a limited democracy.  The risk 
to opt for a democracy led by the Judiciary is that at the end it could drive towards the 
distrust of the democracy.  
 
Being this the state of the art, we coincide with Michael Züm and Edgar Grande29 who 
consider that the broader challenge for the theory and practice of democracy is to 
redesign the mechanisms for the decision making process. This redesign has to combine 
majoritarian procedures as well as structures for the continuous collective negotiation 
between citizens and interest groups. These authors are convinced that part of the 
problem is the idealization of the majoritarian models of representative Democracy. 
They suggest adapting the practice of representation from a consociational point of view 
to build a set of institutional and efficient checks and balances. 
 
                                                            
27 Adams & Van der Schyff, "Political Theory Put to the Test: Comparative Law and the Origins of 
Judicial Constitutional Review" op. cit., p. 30. 
28 Ahumada Marian, “Tribunales Constitucionales y Democracias Desconfiadas” en Confianza y Derecho 
en América Latina, Marcelo Bergman y Carlos Rosenkrantz (coordinadores), Fondo de Cultura 
Económica/CIDE, México, 2009, p. 252. 
29 See, Pauly Louis W., Democracy Beyond the State? The European Dilemma and the Emerging Global 
Order, in a paper prepared for the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, New York, 
February, 2000, p. 10-13. 
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In the Mexican case it is a very complex task by virtue of the cultural and ideological 
authoritarian background. For instance, nowadays bargaining among the political parties 
has a negative connotation among Mexicans. The survey about the Concord and the 
Discord among the Mexicans -Encuesta sobre la Discordia y la Concordia Entre los 
Mexicanos-30 carried out in 2009, reveals that 1 of 3 Mexicans think a politician who 
seeks agreement among the political parties is one who is lacking in leadership or one 
who has betrayed his principles. 
  
Nevertheless, we want to stress that from a deliberative perspective, constitutional 
courts could contribute to generate new dynamics in the social and political order 
through deliberative judgments. According to Francisco Ibarra Palafox,31 the 
deliberative nature of the judgments lies in the chance that their arguments and legal 
reasoning could be located in spaces of the public discussion. Furthermore, in the 
opportunity to create awareness among the citizens, and at the same time inform them 
about civic and democratic values that let them participate in the process of 
consolidation to democracy.  
 
A deliberative judgment has to be able to defend democratic principles and promote 
dialogue among political actors. Such judgments could be seen as instruments to 
promote dialogue as well as potentially pluralist and inclusive documents that could 
have a high degree of political civic education for the population in general. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Mexican case has served to discuss about the role of constitutional courts in new 
democracies. Instead of looking at the risks, I want to focus on the opportunities. From 
my point of view, the Courts can be seen as potential agents of dialogue. They could 
promote a deliberative understanding of democracy in the democratization process, 
through their deliberative judgments. 
 
                                                            
30 See Nexos, Febrero, México, 2009, p. 32. 
31 Ibarra Palafox, Francisco, “La Suprema Corte de Justicia y la Consolidación de la Democracia en 
México”, in Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Eduardo and Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea, Arturo (editors), La ciencia del 
derecho procesal constitucional. Estudios en homenaje a Héctor Fix-Zamudio en sus cincuenta años 
como investigador del derecho, T. II, Tribunales Constitucionales y Democracia, UNAM-IIJ, México, 
2008, pp. 776, 777, 781 to 796. 
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If the Courts assume their role as guardians of the constitution and the (deliberative) 
democracy, one can expect that they stop to substitute the legislature’s will with the 
Courts’ will. It means that a deliberative understanding of democracy from the Courts 
could (1) promote the dialogue among the different actors involved in the political 
decision-making process and, (2) increase the legitimacy of the judicial power. 
 
As I argued above, some courts have changed the way in which they settle their 
judgments. They are elaborating a new vision, a more dialogic one: stating some 
directives to the Executive branch as well as some flexible measures that let the 
authorities make their decisions themselves. Therefore, we propose (1) to analyze the 
relationship between constitutional courts and democracy from a deliberative 
perspective and, (2) to identify a model that let us test the deliberative approach in the 
field.  
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